Suchergebnisse

When the cab rank rule is no longer a defense: considerations when accepting instructions overseas. Barristers have hit the headlines recently for taking instructions on controversial cases in foreign jurisdictions, to which the cab rank rule obliging a barrister to accept any work does not apply. When accepting such cases, barristers should bear in mind whether those foreign proceedings are at odds with their core duties under the Bar Standard Board's Code of Conduct, particularly in politically sensitive cases.

The link between judicial education and an efficient judiciary is, one hopes, obvious. But in order to ensure judicial independence, contemporary wisdom has it, judicial education should also be in the hands of the judiciary. Absent such control, there is a risk that judges may be indoctrinated by interested actors and their independence compromised. Some critics, however, have been sceptical about judicial control of judicial education. Judicial control of education often justified on basis of expertise as well as need to protect independence. But judges are not pedagogues (and their view of what judging does, or should, entail are often untheorized). Nor are they particularly representative of society. In addition, a danger unmitigated by judicial control of judicial education is regulatory capture, defined as 'the result or process by which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry itself'. Even if other voices are integrated into discussions, the danger exists that they might seek to subvert the process to privilege their interests over the general interest. Such concerns have recently been raised in England and Wales with regard to the Equal Treatment Bench Book. The paper examines the relationship between judicial education and judicial independence through the lens of this controversy. It concludes that when judicial education trespass on the independence of the individual judge is not an easy question to answer (not least because education is always about socialization) but, crucially, it is not one answered by putting judicial education in the hands of the judiciary.

Abstract
In the light of increasing discontent with arbitration as a method of investor–State dispute settlement (ISDS), alongside proposals for the establishment of court systems for the settlement of such disputes, this article suggests that such a mechanism might already be available for West African States in the form of the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The ECOWAS Court of Justice, the article shows, can already deal with a variety of investor–State disputes, while reforms are suggested to extend its investment jurisdiction and render it more effective. Such initiatives, it argues, would assist in developing African States' role as 'investment rule makers' rather than 'rule takers', as well as further ECOWAS's mission to promote economic integration within West Africa.